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I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, a corporation facing charges from the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") would hire corporate counsel to collect
and review documents, conduct interviews with employees, and re-
port back with its findings. Corporate counsel often faced ethical
concerns regarding interviewing employees, but generally, a care-
fully crafted blanket statement at the beginning of the interview
explaining corporate counsel's role was sufficient to address these
concerns. However, in 2003, the DOJ adopted charging policies
that drastically changed the rules. These policies, articulated in
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what is now commonly referred to as the "Thompson Memo," after
the author and then Deputy General Larry Thompson, allow pros-
ecutors to consider several factors when deciding whether to prose-
cute and formally charge a corporation. These factors include
waivers of the attorney-client privilege and work product protec-
tions, and whether the company provides legal fees for employees.
These charging policies have led to what some have dubbed the
"deputation" of corporate counsel.' Though the DOJ recently
amended these policies, concerns over privilege waivers and the
"deputation" of corporate counsel remain.
With this new role as a "deputy" of the DOJ has come a new set
of ethical concerns. These concerns range from whether the initial
interview warnings must now be more vigorous to what are the
obligations of corporate counsel to reveal what might otherwise be
confidential or privileged material in order to avoid Brady viola-
tions.2 Furthermore, in light of other factors that the Thompson
Memo considers, many corporations now refuse to fund the legal
defense of employees and require Fifth Amendment waivers under
threat of termination. Thus, corporate counsel must also question
whether the employee interviews violate the legal rights of the
employees.
This Essay explores some of the possible ethical concerns facing
corporate counsel engaged in such investigations. Part II of this
Essay discusses the traditional scope and purpose of internal inves-
tigations, including the application of the attorney-client privilege
and work product protections. Part III tracks the development of
the Thompson Memo and how it has led to the "deputation" of
corporate counsel. Finally, Part IV explores the ethical concerns
the Thompson Memo raises in the context of employee interviews
by corporate counsel during internal investigations.
1. The term "deputation" as used in this Essay does not refer to a formal agreement
or grant of power made by the government with corporate counsel, but rather refers to the
effect the charging polices have on corporate counsel. See Lawrence D. Finder, Internal
Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L.
REV. 111, 117 (2003) (expressing that a company's cooperation with a government investi-
gation "will effectively deputize it into becoming a de facto agent of the government").
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that, regardless of good
faith considerations, any suppression of "[material] evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process"). See generally Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205 (2000) (discussing prosecutors'
disclosure obligations in light of Brady and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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II. THE TRADITIONAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION
A. The Investigation: Purpose and Process
The purpose and scope of an internal investigation can vary de-
pending on the underlying conduct that triggered the investiga-
tion.3 When the investigation is in response to some sort of
government action, outside counsel, and sometimes in-house coun-
sel, are often retained to carry out the investigation, explain the
company's legal rights and possible liabilities, and sometimes to re-
present the company in subsequent legal proceedings.' Use of such
corporate counsel5 is seen as having at least two major benefits: (1)
the investigation will likely "lead to an analysis of the company's
legal rights, obligations and potential liabilities," which are best ad-
dressed by legal counsel; and (2) use of an attorney enables the
company to protect the investigation from third parties by applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege.6 The purpose of such an inves-
tigation is usually to find out what, if any, misconduct has occurred,
the scope of the misconduct, what individuals are involved, and
whether the misconduct is widespread.7 The investigating team can
then advise as to remedial steps that may be necessary and whether
3. See Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation
and Assembling the Investigative Team, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 1, 4-5
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (expressing that corporate conduct
can lead to various confrontations and giving examples of different possible reasons for
conducting an internal investigation); Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investiga-
tions: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 859, 884-86 (citing the myriad of circumstances that trigger internal corporate investi-
gations); see also Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Mufioz, The Internal Corporate Investiga-
tion, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 49, 49 (2002) (mentioning possible reasons for initiating
an internal investigation).
4. Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation and
Assembling the Investigative Team, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 1, 5, 11
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002). The choice between using inside or
outside counsel depends upon a variety of factors, including cost, attorney independence,
and the possibility of inside counsel being called as a witness. Id. at 11-12.
5. The use of the term "corporate counsel" as used throughout this Essay is meant to
encompass both outside and/or in-house counsel employed by a corporation.
6. See id. at 11; see also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal
Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 889
n.120 (noting the consensus among lawyers that investigations should be conducted by
outside counsel as a means of protecting any privileges).
7. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professional-
ism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 888.
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to disclose the results of the investigation to government
authorities.8
The first step in the investigation, after putting a team together,
is collecting and reviewing relevant documents.9 This usually be-
gins with submitting a written document request, or call for docu-
ments, to the company's employees which describes the types of
documents sought and breaks the documents down into well-de-
fined categories. 10 It may also be necessary to talk with employees
about the requests and to actually review and personally pull the
documents directly from their location.1 After collection, the doc-
uments should be numbered, traditionally by a Bates stamp, and
then reviewed for privileged, relevant, and/or "hot" documents.12
8. See id. (discussing several questions that internal investigations may answer); Al-
bert Lilienfeld, Optimizing the Execution and Value of Corporate Investigations, 1548
PRACTISING L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAc. HANDBOOK SERIES 461, 465 (2006) (quoting ad-
vice of Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP partner who says that the investigation
tells the company what remedial steps are necessary).
9. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 890 (2003) (declar-
ing that most commentators believe the first action should be reviewing pertinent
documents); Albert Lilienfeld, Optimizing the Execution and Value of Corporate Investiga-
tions, 1548 PRACTISING L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 461, 465 (2006)
(opining that "the most important first step is collecting and preserving data"); Randall J.
Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 89, 94 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that the first step should be analysis of
all relevant documents). This step is sometimes preceded by a "do not destroy" memo
instructing employees to refrain from carrying out document destruction policies, which
are common especially in large corporations, so as to preserve all possibly relevant docu-
ments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2006) (mandating that lawyers
must not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, de-
stroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A law-
yer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act").
10. Larry A. Gaydos, Gathering and Organizing Relevant Documents: An Essential
Task in Any Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 141, 146 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (summarizing "document gathering, processing,
and review," and providing "several tips on maximizing the likelihood of locating the full
range of requested documents"). The advent of the electronic age has meant that many
documents are now also kept, sometimes exclusively, in electronic format. See id. at 148
(stating that electronic information can include data that hard copies do not, such as up-
dates and who has accessed the information). Thus, document retention and review proce-
dures must focus not only on traditional paper documents, but increasingly on electronic
files and emails.
11. Id. at 146-47.
12. Id. at 148-49. "Bates stamping is the traditional method used" to number col-
lected documents. Id. at 149. "Hot documents" is a term of art often used in litigation to
describe especially important documents. Id. at 143.
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These documents will give the investigating attorneys insight into
the corporate structure, conduct, key events and transactions, and
will later help with the interview process.
13
Though the document review process is important, the most in-
sightful and pivotal step in any internal investigation is the inter-
viewing of employees.1" The employees-ranging from the lowest
echelon to the highest level of management-"are best able to ex-
plain critical events and provide relevant background informa-
tion. ''15 The interview stage is also the stage most likely to raise
ethical issues, in particular with regard to the role of corporate
counsel.' 6
During the course of an interview, an employee may become
confused as to whom the interviewing attorney represents. 17 As
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct make clear, "[a] lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents.' 8 Thus, in or-
der to avoid any such confusion and to meet ethical obligations,
interviewing counsel typically issue pre-interview warnings, some-
times referred to as "Adnarim" warnings (Miranda spelled back-
wards).' 9 Counsel may advise the employees orally or in written
13. See Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGA-
TIONS 89, 90, 94 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that inter-
views are too often conducted before critical documents have been reviewed and that
review may help the attorney structure the interview and evaluate the witness employee's
honesty); see also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics,
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 891 (2003)
(indicating that documents can give "the clearest record of key events or transactions").
14. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profession-
alism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 891-92 (2003); Randall
J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 89, 90 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002).
15. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profession-
alism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 892 (2003).
16. See id. at 892, 934-37 (summarizing the problems and questions surrounding the
role of outside counsel).
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 & cmt. 1 (2006) (warning that an
unrepresented person may have a difficult time discerning where a lawyer's loyalties
belong).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2006) (emphasis added).
19. Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 39-40 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corpo-
rate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 859, 944-46 (2003) (recognizing United State District Judge Frederick Lacey
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memorandum prior to the interview. 20 These warnings should, at a
minimum, make clear that counsel is interviewing the employee as
counsel for the company and does not represent the employee indi-
vidually, as well as set forth that the interview is being conducted
so that counsel can provide legal advice to the company in anticipa-
tion of litigation.21 One commentator suggests the following warn-
ings as a model:
As you know, [your management] has asked you to meet with us as
part of our inquiry into [the matter]. The purpose of our meeting is
so that we can gather the information that we need, as counsel, to
develop the legal advice that the company has sought and to prepare
for possible litigation involving this matter.
I am a lawyer and I represent the company. I do not represent you
or any other employee personally. This inquiry is being undertaken
pursuant to the company's attorney-client privilege, but the company
may decide to waive the privilege at some point in the future. You
cannot waive the attorney-client privilege as applied to this inter-
view. If the company decides to waive its attorney-client privilege, it
can do so without getting your consent and without even consulting
with you. To allow the company to maintain the privileged protec-
tion of the information we gather, it is important that you not discuss
the substance of this interview with anyone.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
22
The three main elements present in this warning are: (1) the in-
terviewing attorneys represent the company, not the employees in-
dividually; (2) the attorney-client privilege applies in the interview,
but the company holds the right to waive the privilege; and (3) the
company desires that the employee maintain the interview's confi-
dentiality.23 Despite these warnings, an employee might, during
as the creator of the term Adnarim); Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 89, 99 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002)
(noting there is little debate that warnings are necessary).
20. See Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGA-
TIONS 89, 96-98 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (highlighting that
regardless of the form, the warning should ensure that the employee knows that counsel
does not represent the employee).
21. Id. The latter phrase is to help ensure full protection of the interview under the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. Id. at 98.
22. Id.
23. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profession-
alism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUm. Bus. L. REV. 859, 942 (2003) (quoting
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the course of an interview, ask for legal advice. 24 In such an in-
stance, the typical protocol is to remind the employee that counsel
represents the company, not the employee individually, and cannot
give the employee legal advice.25 However, as discussed in Part
IV.A., below, the breadth of these warnings may become muddled
in light of an investigation being conducted by "deputized"
counsel.
B. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine
As noted above, an important element of the internal investiga-
tion, and of the interviews themselves, is the application of the at-
torney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The basic
standard for application of the privilege is:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a cli-
ent; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connec-
tion with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose
of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.26
Susan L. Merrill, Internal Investigations, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES 91, 100 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, May 2-3, 2002)).
24. Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGA-
TIONS 89, 103 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002).
25. Id.
26. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950), rejected on other grounds, American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745-
46 (Fed. Cir. 1987); accord Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGA-
TIONS 17, 20 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002). Other courts have
identified a similar standard: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by himself or the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is
waived." Banner v. City of Flint, 99 F. App'x. 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Reed v.
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168,
171 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2005))
(articulating a nearly identical standard).
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More generally stated, in order to claim protection under the at-
torney-client privilege, a party must show: "(1) A communication;
(2) made between privileged persons; (3) in confidence; (4) for the
purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance to the
client. 27
Related to the attorney-client privilege is work-product immu-
nity. However, work-product immunity "'is distinct from and
broader than the attorney-client privilege,"' extending beyond con-
fidential communications to "any document prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation by or for the attorney. "28 To qualify as work
product, information must be (1) in the form of documents or tan-
gible things; (2) "prepared in anticipation of litigation"; and (3)
prepared by the party or its representative, including an attorney.29
At one time, many federal courts limited application of the attor-
ney-client privilege to corporations under a "control group" test.30
This test applied the privilege only where the interviewed em-
ployee could control or substantially participate in a corporate de-
cision based upon the attorney's advice, or if the employee
belonged to a group which had the authority, such that he, in ef-
fect, personified the corporation. 31 However, this approach was
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United
States. 32
27. Wilson v. Foti, No. Civ. A. 02-2244, 2004 WL 744874, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 6, 2004)
(quoting EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 46 (4th ed. 2001)); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976) (asserting that "[c]onfidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to
obtain legal assistance are privileged"). Though this standard is articulated in terms of
communications from a client to an attorney, the privilege also covers communications
from an attorney to a client. Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618
(D. Kan. 2001) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); Sprague v.
Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370-71 (10th Cir. 1997)).
28. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. Ferko v. NASCAR, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 136 (E.D. Tex. 2003). Nevertheless, an
exception exists in federal courts, and a party may obtain work-product materials "upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the prepa-
ration of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
30. See United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 42-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (discussing the
test approved and used by several circuits).
31. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962)).
32. 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (rejecting the control group test); cf. also Nat'l Con-
verting & Fulfillment Corp. v. Bankers Trust Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 n.1 (N.D. Tex.
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In Upjohn, the petitioner, Upjohn Company ("Upjohn"), main-
tained that questionnaires sent by its attorneys to its employees
were privileged.3 3 The questionnaires were part of an internal in-
vestigation to discover whether subsidiaries attempted to secure
government business by making payments directly to foreign gov-
ernment officials.34 Upjohn's attorneys interviewed many of its of-
ficers and employees, including those that received the
questionnaire, as part of its investigation.35 Subsequently, the In-
ternal Revenue Service issued a summons demanding production
of these materials.3 6 Upjohn claimed the documents "were pro-
tected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and consti-
tuted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of
litigation. '3 7 The district court ordered the production of the dis-
puted materials,38 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications "made
by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's ac-
tions in response to legal advice,"3 9 thus adopting the "control
group" theory.
The Supreme Court rejected this "control group" approach, stat-
ing that it overlooked "that the privilege exists to protect not only
the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also
the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound
and informed advice."4 The Court noted that lower echelon em-
ployees frequently possess information that a corporation's lawyers
need to adequately inform and advise on the existing or potential
problems; "[t]he control group test adopted by the court below
thus frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging
the communication of relevant information by employees of the
2001) (recognizing Texas's adoption of the "subject matter" test in accordance with the
Upjohn Court's reasoning).
33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-88 (1981).
34. Id. at 386.
35. Id. at 387.
36. Id. at 387-88.
37. Id. at 388. In Upjohn, "the company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to
the Securities and Exchange Commission . .. disclosing certain questionable payments."
Id. at 387.
38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 388. The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn waived the
attorney-client privilege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 390.
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client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client cor-
poration."'4 1 The Court concluded that the communications from
the Upjohn employees to its corporate counsel were protected
under the attorney-client privilege, and thus the questionnaire re-
sponses and all notes stemming from interview questions were pro-
tected by the privilege.42 Therefore, "communications from lower
echelon employees [are] within the privilege as long as the commu-
nications [are] made to the attorney to assist him in giving legal
advice to the client corporation.
43
The application of the attorney-client privilege and work-prod-
uct immunity are important in the corporate context as corpora-
tions do not enjoy Fifth Amendment protections. Internal
investigations frequently involve conduct that may be labeled as
criminal or fraudulent.4 4 Furthermore, aspects of the investigation
may reveal information that can be used in third-party suits, such
as shareholder derivative suits. 45 The attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine ensure that disclosure of the results of an
internal investigation cannot be compelled, thus protecting the cor-
poration and its employees from having the fruits of the investiga-
tion used against them. Though a corporation may later choose to
disclose the results of its investigation, the decision should be a vol-
untary one, made after carefully weighing the risks of disclosure.4 6
41. Id. at 391-92.
42. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). The Supreme Court also
opined that the work-product privilege was possibly applicable to some attorney "notes
and memoranda of interviews." Id. at 397-401.
43. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-97 (1981)); see also PaineWebber Group, Inc. v.
Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1999) (asserting that "[t]he Su-
preme Court confirmed that the privilege applies broadly to communications made by cor-
porate employees to counsel to secure legal advice from counsel").
44. Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 84 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002).
45. See id. (explaining the "Garner rule," which allows communications normally pro-
tected by the privilege to be discovered in shareholder actions where good cause is shown).
46. Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation
and Assembling the Investigative Team, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 1, 10
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also Thomas E. Holliday &
Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of Internal Investigations to the Government or
Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 279, 280 (Brad D. Brian &
Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (warning of the need to analyze carefully what disclo-
sure will mean for the company).
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III. THE "DEPUTATION" OF CORPORATE COUNSEL
The general principles described above were fundamentally al-
tered by a 1999 memorandum issued by then Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder.47 Prior to this memorandum, more com-
monly known as the "Holder Memo," the DOJ did not have a clear
policy regarding the factors to consider in determining whether to
formally charge corporations with an indictment.48 The Holder
Memo set out eight factors to be considered:
In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring
charges, and negotiating plea agreements, prosecutors should con-
sider the following factors in reaching a decision as to the proper
treatment of a corporate target:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any,
governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories
of crime;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, includ-
ing the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corpo-
rate management;
3. The corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdo-
ing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attor-
ney-client and work-product privileges;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program;
47. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, to All Compo-
nent Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations
§§ III.B., VI.A. (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/
Chargingcorps.html (focusing on the factors prosecutors should consider when determining
whether to bring criminal charges against a particular corporation); see also Memorandum
from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Compo-
nents and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organi-
zations § VI. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-
guidelines.htm (reiterating the emphasis on evaluating corporate cooperation).
48. Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputa-
tion of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 113-15 (2003) (noting that prior to the
Holder Memo and the 1991 institution of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines chapter re-
garding sentencing of organizations, the only real guidance came in the form of the United
States Attorney's Manual, which was primarily geared toward individuals).
2007] ESSAY 1075
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1065
6. The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to im-
plement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve
an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline
or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with
the relevant government agencies;
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable; and
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regula-
tory enforcement actions.49
Of particular relevance is factor 4, which provided that coopera-
tion could "includ[e], if necessary, the waiver of the corporate at-
torney-client and work-product privileges."5 Despite concerns
that this provision essentially gave prosecutors the discretion to
pressure corporations to disclose privileged materials even before
there was any actual finding of wrongdoing, in 2003, then Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson reiterated these factors in what
has been dubbed the "Thompson Memo."51
49. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, to All Component
Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations
§ II.A. (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Charging
corps.html (internal cross-references omitted).
50. Id.
51. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corpo-
rate..guidelines.htm. The Thompson Memo states:
In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating
plea agreements, prosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a deci-
sion as to the proper treatment of a corporate target:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public,
and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corpora-
tions for particular categories of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity
in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and
regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willing-
ness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program;
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective
corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace responsible
management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to coop-
erate with the relevant government agencies;
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The Thompson Memo essentially restated the Holder Memo fac-
tors with an additional ninth factor regarding the "adequacy of the
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's malfea-
sance."52 More importantly, the Thompson Memo also provided
that a corporation's advancement of attorneys' fees to culpable em-
ployees may be considered by prosecutors when evaluating
whether a corporation had cooperated.53 Furthermore, the
Thompson Memo made abundantly clear the importance of a cor-
poration lending its full cooperation, stating that:
[I]n assessing the adequacy of a corporation's cooperation is the
completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the
attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect to its
internal investigation and with respect to communications between
specific officers, directors and employees and counsel. Such waivers
permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual coopera-
tion or immunity agreements. In addition, they are often critical in
enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a corpora-
tion's voluntary disclosure and cooperation.
54
The effect of the Thompson Memo has been profound, leading
to what many commentators have dubbed a "culture of waiver"
amongst corporations, i.e., the fear of negative impact from failing
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders, pen-
sion holders and employees not proven personally culpable and impact on the pub-
lic arising from the prosecution; and
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's
malfeasance;
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Id. § II. (internal cross-references omitted).
52. Id. § II.A.8.
53. Id. § VI.B. Many view this provision as essentially encouraging corporations to
leave their employees "high and dry" despite the presumption of innocence. See Corporate
Injustice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at A14 (arguing that the Thompson Memo prompts
corporations enduring government investigation to "cut their accused employees adrift"
before there has been any adjudication of guilt); Nathan Koppel, U.S. Urges Firms to Stop
Funding Staffs' Defense, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B4 (recounting that the Thompson
Memo sparked much of the debate surrounding how a corporation's unwillingness to pay
an accused employee's legal fees can be equated with willingness to cooperate with a gov-
ernment investigation).
54. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations § VI.B. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
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to disclose privileged materials has caused corporations to feel ob-
ligated to waive the privilege on a regular basis.55 Though the
Thompson Memo does not explicitly require the disclosure of privi-
leged materials for a corporation to be deemed "cooperating," this
factor has been perceived by corporations to be a requirement to
avoid indictment. 6
The existence of this culture of waiver is supported by a recent
survey of inside and outside counsel conducted by, among others,
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL") and the Association of Corporate Counsel
("ACC").5 7 Their survey found that nearly 75% of some 1,400 re-
spondents reported that a culture of waiver has arisen where gov-
55. See Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Fear a DOJ "Culture of Waiver", NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13,
2006, at 13 (disclosing that "[a] survey of in-house and outside counsel by a coalition of
business and legal organizations reports that a 'culture of waiver' of the attorney-client
privilege now exists in corporate investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
and other federal agencies"); Attorneys-Corporate Counsel Uncertainty Over Attorney-
Client Privilege Eroding Client Communication, Speakers Say, U.S. LAW WEEK, May 10,
2005, at 2661 (reporting that waiver has become the norm rather than an option); U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 35 (2006), available at http://www.uschamber.
com/publications/reports/0603sec.htm (stating that "[i]nterviewees generally expressed the
view that, as a result of the recent policies advanced by the DOJ and the [SEC], corpora-
tions have felt intense pressure to waive attorney-client privilege and work-product protec-
tion during SEC investigations").
56. See Testimony of Gerald B. Lefcourt Before the ABA Task Force on Attorney-
Client Privilege 1-2, (April 21, 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legisla-
tion/WhiteCollar001/$FILE/LefcourtjTestimony.pdf (expressing "that corporations have
no choice but to waive privilege when it is demanded, requested, or even suggested, be-
cause the stakes of corporate prosecution are too high"); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 32, 35 (2006) (describing that many corporate personnel reported being fear-
ful of adverse consequences should they refuse to relinquish their privileges); Attorneys-
Corporate Counsel, Uncertainty Over Attorney-Client Privilege Eroding Client Communica-
tion, Speakers Say, U.S. LAW WEEK (LEGAL NEWS), May 10, 2005, at 2661 (supposing that
many corporate entities have begun to feel as if "the 'option' of waiver of the privilege has
eroded into an 'expectation' of waiver on the part of regulators, government agencies, and
external auditors in exchange for leniency or evidence of cooperation"); see also Nathan
Koppel, U.S. Urges Firms to Stop Funding Staffs Defense, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at
BI (noting that companies are concerned about possible indictment as a result of less than
full cooperation with government investigators).
57. See Assoc. OF CORP. COUNSEL, THE DECLINE OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, SURVEY RESULTS PRESENTED TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
AND THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/
attyclient2.pdf (describing the query made by a coalition of organizations to corporate and
criminal defense counsel regarding the supposed erosion of the attorney-client privilege).
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ernment agencies expect corporations to waive legal privileges.5 8
Furthermore, a recent review of corporate pretrial agreements en-
tered into with the DOJ after the release of the Thompson Memo
suggests that privilege waivers were sought in more than two-thirds
of those cases.59 Considering the consequences associated with
perceived non-cooperation, i.e., indictment, it is little wonder that
corporations choose to waive the applicable privileges rather than
risk criminal charges.
This "culture of waiver" transforms the internal investigation
from one driven purely by the corporation's interests into one
driven by the DOJ's interests.6 ° Corporate counsel no longer begin
investigations from the standpoint that privileges and protections
may be waived, but rather begin their investigations knowing that
58. Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Fear a DOJ "Culture of Waiver", NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13,
2006, at 13; accord Assoc. OF CORP. COUNSEL, THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, SURVEY RESULTS PRESENTED TO THE U.S. CON-
GRESS AND THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 3 (2006), available at http://www.acca.com/
Surveys/attyclient2.pdf. A similar study conducted by the NACDL found that 87% of re-
spondents believed the attorney-client and work-product privileges were currently being
challenged by various entities, including federal government agencies. NAT'L Ass'N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS SURVEY: THE ATT-ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IS UNDER ATTACK
2 (2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/Overcriminalization02/
$FILE/ACSurvey.pdf. Despite these results, some point to a survey conducted in 2002 by
a DOJ Ad Hoc Advisory Group where prosecutors were asked about the frequency with
which waivers were requested. Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business
Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 597-98
(2004). According to this survey, "requests for waiver of the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection were the exception rather than the rule ..... Id. at 598. The
accuracy of this survey has been called into question, however, due to the results of the
more recently conducted NACDL and ACC surveys, as well as on the basis of the ques-
tions asked. See Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Fear a DOJ "Culture of Waiver", NAT'L L.J., Mar.
13, 2006, at 13 (expressing opinions concerning the narrowness of the DOJ's 2002 survey
compared to "the coalition's more recent and detailed survey"); see also Corporate Law-
yers Launch Attack on "Culture of Waiver", CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 6, 2006, at 4, available
at www.corporatecrimereporter.com/waiver03O6O6.htm (quoting Stephanie Martz, Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, who said that, in its survey, the govern-
ment asked the U.S. Attorneys if they formally requested "'privilege waivers on a routine
basis"'-but that "'they could all say no and still be asking on a periodic basis"').
59. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The De-
partment of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 22 (2006) (noting
that out of "thirty-eight post-Thompson Memo pre-trial agreements [reviewed],. . . twenty-
six included privilege waivers").
60. See Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Dep-
utation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 117 (2003) (contending that federal
officials now begin their investigations with an advantage because, through privilege waiv-
ers, they have access to evidence gathered during the corporation's internal investigation).
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everything they discover, every note they take, and every interview
they conduct will be reviewed by the DOJ and federal prosecu-
tors. 61 In this vein, cooperation essentially deputizes the corpora-
tion, and corporate counsel, as de facto agents of the government.
62
Thus the term "deputation" does not refer to a formal deputation
of corporate counsel whereby the DOJ explicitly grants powers to
the corporate counsel, but rather refers to the effect the charging
policies have had, i.e., to have corporate counsel conduct aspects of
the investigation for the DOJ.
63
Additionally, the "deputation" of corporate counsel may go even
further than simply collecting documents and conducting inter-
views for the government; in some cases, misrepresentations made
to corporate counsel during such an investigation may lead to
charges for obstruction of justice. For instance, three executives of
a software company, Computer Associates, pled guilty to federal
charges for obstruction of justice in 2004, based on statements
made, not to federal prosecutors, but to corporate counsel hired by
the company to investigate the company's accounting practices,
which were called into question by the DOJ and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 64 Further allegations brought against the
former CEO of Computer Associates alleged that the executive
provided false information regarding the company's accounting
practices, with knowledge that the misinformation would be re-
layed to the United States Attorney's Office, and that he, there-
61. See id. (urging that corporations are expected to hand over to government prose-
cutors "employee interviews, documents, and evidentiary analyses" accumulated by the
corporation through internal investigation).
62. Id.; see also George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 993 (2005) (noting that "employees who answer questions of com-
pany counsel or seek their advice are effectively speaking to prosecutors if the company
later becomes the subject of a federal investigation").
63. See Robert J. Sussman, Practicing White Collar Criminal Defense in the Post-En-
ron Era: Some Changes in the System, THE Hous. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 28 (noting that
in response to allegations that the Thompson Memo essentially allowed the government to
piggyback on the company's investigation, U.S. Attorney James B. Comey stated that this
was correct and that "there is nothing wrong with that").
64. Alex Berenson, 3 Plead Guilty in Computer Associates Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2004, at Cl; George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 985, 985-86 (2005).
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fore, had knowingly conspired to impede the official proceedings.65
Thus, through these circumstances, corporate counsel can in effect
become a representative of the government so that "misleading
counsel carries the same criminal sanctions as misleading federal
authorities.
66
Due to concerns over what has been perceived as a developing
culture of waiver, a coalition of diverse parties, including the
NACDL, ACC, American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, has lobbied against the Thompson Memo
in favor of legislation to prohibit practices that erode the attorney-
client privilege.67 These groups have argued that the practice of
65. George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 985, 985-86 (2005) (quoting Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Kumar, No.
1:04-cr-00846-ILG-ALL (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004)).
66. Id. at 986; see also ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ET AL.,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 302B, § II., n.15 (2006), avail-
able at http://abanet.org/media/docs/302Brevised.pdf (remarking that people may be prose-
cuted "under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for impeding an 'official proceeding"' after making
false statements to private legal counsel assisting in a corporation's internal investigation).
67. See Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J.
EREPORT, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/dl5specter.
html (describing that "a coalition of strange bedfellows ... called for the Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2006 to be enacted into law" in order to prevent further degra-
dation of the protections intended by the privilege). The coalition won a significant victory
recently with regards to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Under § 8C2.5(g) of the
Organizational Guidelines, entitled "Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Re-
sponsibility," an organization is capable of earning a reduction in its culpability score (and
fine range) where it has "fully cooperated in the investigation." See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2005). Prior to 2004, the Guidelines made no mention
of waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but on May 1, 2004, the Sentencing Commission
amended Application Note Twelve to § 8C2.5, adding the following sentence: "Waiver of
attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduc-
tion in culpability score under subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (g) unless such waiver
is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information
known to the organization." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) app.
* C, amend. 673 (2005) (showing the 2004 changes). In response, the coalition expressed
their concerns and opposition to the amendment, through letters and testimony, before the
Sentencing Commission. See Rhonda McMillion, Matters of Privilege, ABA J., Feb. 2006,
at 70 (explaining the coalition's response to the Sentencing Guidelines adoption of the
privilege-waiver amendment); see also Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Waiver of
Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 3, avail-
able at www.magislaw.com/articles/07OllO5OOOlMorvillo.pdf (noting that the coalition gave
notice it would fight further "erosion of the attorney-client privilege"). The Sentencing
Commission responded by reconsidering the addition of the waiver language, and the "co-
alition of business, civil rights, and bar organizations scored a significant victory" in April
2006, when the Sentencing Commission unanimously voted to delete the waiver language.
Marcia Coyle, Business Coalition Wins Big on Thorny Waiver Issue, NAT'L L.J., April 11,
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conditioning cooperation upon waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege has significantly eroded the principles underlying the privilege:
full and frank communication with one's attorney.68
In response to pressure exerted by these groups and other critics,
the DOJ issued new charging policies in a memorandum issued by
Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty on December 12,
2006.69 The McNulty Memo makes two significant changes to the
Thompson Memo. First, the McNulty Memo states that prosecu-
tors "generally should not take into account whether a corporation
is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investi-
gation and indictment," except "[i]n extremely rare cases,... when
the totality of the circumstances show that it was intended to im-
pede a criminal investigation. ' 7° Second, the McNulty Memo re-
quires that prosecutors obtain written approval before seeking
2006, at 4; see also Anne Marie Squeo, Agency Weighs Ending Leniency For Executive
Cooperation Probes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2006, at A4 (noting that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission added a potential rule change, altering the current leniency companies get for
waiving legal privileges, in the Federal Register for public comment).
68. See Letter from Griffin B. Bell et al., former senior Justice Department Officials,
to Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General 1-2 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.
abanet.org/media/docs/ag__sept52006.pdf (protesting the government's tactics in investigat-
ing corporate wrongdoing that they see as "seriously eroding" attorney-client privilege and
noting the inability of employees to be fully open due to the lack of the privilege); see also
ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 302B, § I (2006), available at http://abanet.org/media/
docs/302Brevised.pdf (purporting that the Thompson Memo has caused the erosion of indi-
viduals' constitutional rights).
69. See id. (contending that the McNulty Memo, which replaced the Thompson
Memo, asserts that federal investigators should follow a milder approach when seeking
privilege waivers from corporations); Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney
General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations § VII.B.2., at 8-9 (Dec. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf (instructing that federal pros-
ecutors should only pursue "waiver of attorney-client or work product protections when
there is a legitimate need for the privileged information," and even then, to the least ex-
pansive extent possible).
70. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Depart-
ment Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busi-
ness Organizations § VII.B.3., at 11 & n.3 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf; see also Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo":
Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 2006, at 25 (reiterating that federal prosecu-
tors may take into account a corporation's payment of an employee's legal fees when such
payment is made only to hinder the government's investigation of the company).
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privilege waivers. 71 What kind of approval depends on the type of
waiver sought as the McNulty Memo designates two categories of
72waiver.
The first category, Category I, includes "purely factual informa-
tion, which may or may not be privileged, relating to the underly-
ing misconduct .... " In order to seek a waiver of such Category
I materials, "prosecutors must obtain written authorization from
the United States Attorney who must ... consult with[ ] the Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Criminal Division before granting or
denying the request. '74 The second category, Category II, includes
attorney-client communications and non-factual work product.75
Before requesting a Category II waiver, the United States Attor-
ney must receive the Deputy Attorney General's written authori-
zation by setting forth the legitimate need for the waiver as well as
the scope of the waiver being sought.76 To establish a legitimate
need for material from either category, the McNulty Memo sets
forth four factors:
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information
will benefit the government's investigation;
71. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Depart-
ment Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busi-
ness Organizations § VII.B.2., at 10 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty.memo.pdf.
72. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Depart-
ment Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busi-
ness Organizations § VII.B.2., at 10 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty.memo.pdf.
73. Id. This category seems akin to ordinary or "fact" work product. Ordinary or fact
work product is the "written or oral information transmitted to the attorney and recorded
as conveyed by the client." In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
Such ordinary or fact work product may be obtained, despite the privilege, upon a showing
of substantial need and an inability to otherwise obtain the privileged work product with-
out material hardship. Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Techs., Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339-40 (6th
Cir. 1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam). The McNulty Memo would thus allow prosecutors to avoid these burdens if a
waiver was granted.
74. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Depart-
ment Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busi-
ness Organizations § VII.B.2., at 9 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
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(2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and
complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require
waiver;
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided;
and
(4) the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.77
At first glance, the McNulty Memo appears to resolve many of
the Thompson Memo's critics' concerns. However, many feel that
the McNulty Memo does little in terms of meaningful change.78
With regard to the advancing of legal fees, some critics believe that
the exception regarding impeding an investigation may be too eas-
ily met.79  And there are many criticisms of the new two-tiered
waiver system.
First, rather than do away with privilege waivers all together, the
McNulty Memo continues to allow such waivers to be considered
in charging decisions, just with a higher level of oversight.8 0 Some
charge that this position will not halt the erosion of the attorney-
client privilege because as long as the possibility that the privilege
may be waived exists, communications between attorneys and cor-
porate clients may be chilled.81 Also, the guidelines are internal
policies with no remedy at law to corporations under investigation
if a prosecutor fails to follow the proper protocols.8 2 Thus, it is
77. Id. at 9.
78. See Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 15, 2006, at 25 (explaining that many business people, lawyers, and legal scholars are
doubtful that the McNulty Memo will bring about any change in the way that waivers are
sought from corporations by federal prosecutors); Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes
Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.abanet.
org/journal/ereport/dl5specter.html (contending that instead of representing an improve-
ment in the legal system, the McNulty Memo "threatens to further erode the ability of
corporate leaders to seek and obtain the legal guidance they need to effectively comply
with the law").
79. Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
15, 2006, at 25.
80. Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J. ERE-
PORT, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/dl5specter.html
(quoting ABA President Karen J. Mathis).
81. See id. (opining that the McNulty Memo may cause further damage to a corporate
leader's ability to obtain necessary legal counseling (quoting ABA President Karen J.
Mathis)).
82. Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
15, 2006, at 25.
[Vol. 38:10651084
ESSAY
uncertain whether the policy will be strictly enforced internally or
whether rogue prosecutors can continue implicitly to demand privi-
lege waivers. And even if the proper channels are followed, it is as
of yet unclear whether the request to seek a privilege waiver will
simply be met with rubber stamp approval, making the approval
process meaningless. 83 Furthermore, the two-category system itself
has problems as it is very difficult to separate purely factual materi-
als from materials that reflect an attorney's core work product, i.e.,
the attorney's opinion work product.84 Finally, though the Mc-
Nulty Memo attempts to address some of the concerns raised by
the Thompson Memo, it noticeably fails to change other important
considerations, such as that prosecutors may still weigh a corpora-
tion's information sharing between the corporation and employees
regarding the investigation or a corporation's retention or failure
to sanction employees who assert Fifth Amendment rights.85
The McNulty Memo is still in its infancy and whether the con-
cerns raised by the Thompson Memo are fully alleviated has yet to
be seen. It appears doubtful, however, in light of the immediate
criticism the McNulty Memo has received, that concerns regarding
the "culture of waiver" will go away within the foreseeable fu-
ture.8 6 In light of the continued allowance of privilege waivers, the
potential for "deputized" counsel appears to remain and thus the
ethical implications for "deputized" counsel remain a relevant
concern.
IV. ETHICAL CONCERNS OF "DEPUTIZED" COUNSEL
The "deputation" of corporate counsel has serious ethical ramifi-
cations. Because corporate counsel now often begins its investiga-
tion knowing that the results will be handed over to the DOJ, it
83. See id. (asserting a Washington D.C. lawyer's opinion that the DOJ and the
changes to the government's charging system proposed by the McNulty Memo are under a
probationary period as no one is sure whether they will be effective).
84. See id. (noting that "Stephanie Martz, director of the white-collar crime project at
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, called the two new categories of
protected materials 'very deceiving"').
85. See id. (stating that federal prosecutors may still evaluate a company's internal
communications and its behavior toward employees accused of wrongdoing when deciding
whether to pursue waiver).
86. See generally id. (exuding that there is still much concern among lawyers and busi-
ness people about the government's continued use of waiver as an element in charging
companies for alleged wrongdoing).
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should no longer rely on the standard boilerplate warnings that
have sufficed for years. But the ramifications go beyond the initial
warnings. Counsel conducting interviews where employees have
been coerced into waiving Fifth Amendment protections, under
threat of termination, and/or who have been denied funding for
legal fees, may be violating the legal rights of the employees they
interview. Finally, "deputized" counsel may face a moral dilemma
with regard to exculpatory materials it discovers which the DOJ
either has failed to notice or chosen to ignore.
A. Interview Warnings
The most obvious impact on "deputized" counsel is with regard
to the initial warnings. As noted above, the interview process typi-
cally begins with some sort of boiler-plate disclaimer intended to
make clear to the interviewee that the interviewing attorney repre-
sents the corporation, not the employee, and that the privilege pro-
tecting the interview notes may be waived by the corporation. 87 At
the very least, "deputized" counsel who knows that the results in
fact will be waived and handed over to the DOJ should make the
interviewees aware of that fact. To continue to advise the em-
ployee that the results may remain privileged at the corporation's
discretion, when the attorney knows that the corporation is in fact
waiving the privilege, would be clearly misleading and in violation
of Model Rule 4.1(a): "[i]n the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person ....88 But beyond simply informing
employees that the interview will not be protected, does the "depu-
tized" counsel have any further duties, such as to warn the witness
that his or her statements could be used against him or her, or to
advise the witness to retain separate counsel?
89
87. See, e.g., Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVES-
TIGATIONS 89, 103 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (charging retained
counsel to be forthcoming in informing the interviewing employee that counsel represents
the company, to whom the privilege belongs).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4.1(a) (2006); Sarah Helene Duggin, Inter-
nal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 859, 944 (2003) (noting that even if statements of a corpora-
tion's intentions for disclosure are not technically false, they are still likely misleading and
violate Model Rule 4.1).
89. Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGA-
TIONs 89, 90 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that an inter-
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If the interviewing attorney is a prosecutor, the ethical rules are
clearer. Model Rule 3.8, titled "Special Responsibilities of a Prose-
cutor," provides that "[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall...
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been ad-
vised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and
has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel." 90 These
rules also prohibit a prosecutor from seeking a waiver of pretrial
rights from an unrepresented accused. 91 Thus, it would appear that
a prosecutor should advise an interviewee that the interviewee has
the right to obtain counsel. The procedure United States Attor-
neys must go through to interview "target" witnesses often requires
issuance of a subpoena by a grand jury, which in turn will put the
interviewee on notice of the right to remain silent and for the need
to obtain an attorney. 92 But the corporate "deputized" counsel is
not a prosecutor, so do similar ethical obligations apply with regard
to pre-interview warnings?
The Model Rules provide some bare guidance, stating that "[i]n
dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, mem-
bers, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. '93 The Model Rule's
comments clarify this mandate, stating that when the company's
interests are adverse to the employee's, the interviewing attorney
should advise the employee that the attorney cannot represent the
employee and that they "may wish to obtain independent represen-
tation."'94 Similarly, Model Rule 4.3 provides that, in dealing with
an unrepresented person, "[t]he lawyer shall not give legal advice
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure coun-
sel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the inter-
viewing attorney's obligations with regard to these further warnings is the subject of
debate).
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2006).
91. Id. 3.8(c).
92. See U.S. A-rORNEY'S MANUAL §§ 9-11.150, .151 (2006) (discussing the issuance of
subpoenas before the questioning of witnesses and the substance of advice given to them
when they are served with a subpoena).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2006).
94. Id. 1.13(f) cmt. 10. Whether such a warning should be given turns on the facts of
each case. See id. 1.13(f) (indicating that a lawyer has a duty to warn when he or she
reasonably knows the company's interests are adverse to the employee to be interviewed).
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ests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being
in conflict with the interests of the client."9 5 In a situation in which
an internal investigation is being conducted, particularly if the in-
terviewee is the subject of the interview, it can be argued that the
attorney should know that there is a "reasonable possibility" of
there being a conflict of interest. And even if this is not clear from
the outset of the interview, as an interview progresses it may be-
come clear that an interviewee's interests are at odds with the cor-
poration's interests.
To meet the obligations imposed on counsel under the Model
Rules, some commentators suggest giving very broad warnings,
similar to Miranda warnings.96 For instance, United States District
Judge Frederick Lacey suggests the following model instructions:
I am not your lawyer, I represent the corporation. It is the corpora-
tion's interests I have been retained to serve. You are entitled to
have your own lawyer. If you cannot afford a lawyer, the corpora-
tion may, or may not, pay his fee. You may wish to consult with him
before you confer with me. Among other things, you may wish to
claim the privilege against self-incrimination. You may wish not to
talk to me at all.
What you tell me, if it relates to the performance of your duties,
and is confidential, will be privileged. The privilege, however, re-
quires explanation. It is not your privilege to claim. It is the corpo-
ration's privilege. Thus, not only can I tell, I must tell, others in the
corporation what you have told me, if it is necessary to enable me to
provide the legal services to the corporation it has retained me to
provide.
Moreover, the corporation can waive its privilege and thus, the
president, or I, or someone else, can disclose to the authorities what
you tell me if the corporation decides to waive its privilege.
Also, if I find wrongdoing, I am under certain obligations to report
it to the Board of Directors and perhaps the stockholders.
Finally, the fact that our conversation is privileged does not mean
that what you did, or said, is protected from disclosure just because
you tell me about it. You may be subpoenaed, for example, and re-
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2006).
96. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profession-
alism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 944 (2003) (pointing out
that some commentators suggest going beyond mere pre-interview warnings by adopting
"full-fledged Miranda-type warnings").
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While some commentators believe such a dire warning is needed
to ensure that the employee is clear on the role of the corporate
attorney, other commentators disagree, arguing that such warnings
are likely to bring the interview to a screeching halt.98 Indeed, such
warnings may run counter to the attorney's obligations to his or her
client. Telling an employee that he can obtain outside counsel or
stopping an interview where the employee is revealing personally
damaging information will likely hinder the attorney's ability to get
information from the employee. Though it may be permissible for
an attorney to advise an employee that he may seek outside repre-
sentation, it may not be in the corporation's best interest for the
employee actually to secure such representation. 99 As the New
York City Bar Association recently articulated: "Because affirma-
tively advising a corporate employee to secure counsel may work
against the interests of the corporation, we believe it is appropriate
for corporate counsel to be reluctant to render that advice-at
least in the absence of the consent of his client to do so.''1° Thus,
97. Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 40 (Brad D.
Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (quoting Frederick B. Lacey, former judge,
U.S. Dist. of N.J.). Presumably, the phrase relating to waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege would be altered in cases in which it was known the privilege was in fact being waived
to reflect the same.
98. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 946 (2003) (lament-
ing that such a warning could "bring an internal investigation to a grinding halt"); see also
Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 89, 99
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (finding that existing case law does
not require such extensive warnings). But see Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Impli-
cations of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPO-
RATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 40 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002)
(acknowledging the potential fear such a warning may elicit, but emphasizing that employ-
ees need sufficient information to understand that the interviewing attorney is not their
attorney).
99. See Paul B. Murphy & Lucian E. Dervan, Watching Your Step: Avoiding the Pit-
falls and Perils of Corporate Internal Investigations, 16 ALAS Loss PREVENTION J. 2, 4-5
(2005) (stating that advising an employee who has relevant information to obtain counsel
might go against the company's interests).
100. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y. Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2004-
02 (2004), available at http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/print-report.php?rid=
240&searchterm=2004-02.
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advising an employee to obtain individual representation may be
counter to the interviewing attorney's ethical obligations to his or
her corporate client.
Under most state's ethical standards, corporate counsel has few
obligations beyond the bare warnings already given. 1°1 Yet corpo-
rate counsel's unique new role as a "deputy" of the government,
especially in light of the dire consequences, such as obstruction of
justice charges, that may befall the employee who does not under-
stand that role, makes the traditional boilerplate warnings seem
lacking and incomplete.10 2 As one commentator has characterized
the dilemma: "If the bar does not better define ethical rules for
these situations, there will also be substantial variations in practice
that serve neither the client and its employees nor the reputation of
the legal profession. "103
B. Respecting the Legal Rights of Interviewee
With regard to the individual employees, the "deputation" of
corporate counsel has serious Fifth and Sixth Amendment implica-
tions when a corporation feels pressure to require its employees to
waive their Fifth Amendment rights or refuses to pay its employ-
ees' legal fees. 104 In considering whether a corporation has cooper-
ated, the Thompson Memo provides that prosecutors may consider
whether the organization is supporting "culpable employees and
101. See, e.g., Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE IN-
VESTIGATIONS 89, 98-99 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002) (asserting
that existing case law does not require any additional warnings beyond making sure the
employee knows who the lawyer represents and that the company controls the attorney-
client privilege).
102. See Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in
Tough Spot, N.Y.L.J., Jul. 24, 2006, at 10, available at www.akerman.com/documents/
PickholzWhiteCollarNYLJ7-24-06.pdf (noting that the question of outside counsel acting
as "state actors" renews focus on whether employers should explain to employees, prior to
the interview process, their constitutional rights).
103. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 946 (2003).
104. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y 2006)
(finding that the Thompson Memo, as applied by the government, violated interviewed
employees' Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to represen-
tation by counsel); Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Fed-
eral Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 121-22 (2003) (explaining
that, by disfavoring the practice of employers covering the attorney fees of their employ-
ees, employees' Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination could be
circumvented).
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agents, either through the advancing of attorneys fees, [or] through
retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct
.... "105 By implementing this provision, prosecutors have some-
times "made it known that, as a condition of complete cooperation,
an organization will be expected to discharge [e]mployees who as-
sert their right against self-incrimination when requested to pro-
vide interviews or other information by the government's criminal
or civil enforcement investigators. ' 10 6 Prosecutors also rely on this
provision to discourage the advancing of legal fees to corporate
employees, thus depriving employees of "the support and re-
sources they need to defend themselves."'' 0 7 Though the McNulty
Memo has generally stated that seeking a waiver of attorneys' fees
should not be considered, it accepts that it may be a relevant con-
sideration if the advancing of legal fees is done to impede an inves-
tigation-a standard that some fear may be too easily met.108
Furthermore, the McNulty Memo does not address the pressuring
of employees to waive their Fifth Amendment rights. The constitu-
tionality of both of these practices is suspect and has been called
into question on both legal and practical grounds. 10 9
105. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations § VI.B. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate__guidelines.htm.
106. ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ET AL., REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 302B, § VI. (2006), available at http://abanet.
org/media/docs/302Brevised.pdf; see also The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the
Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 12 (2006) (statement of Karen J. Mathis, President, ABA), available at http://www.
abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060912 testimony-mathis-acpriv.pdf (explaining that
the Thompson Memo discourages cooperation credit for companies if they fail to punish or
fire employees who exercise their Fifth Amendment rights when the government requests
information).
107. ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ET AL., REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 302B, § VI. (2006), available at http://abanet.
org/medialdocs/302Brevised.pdf; see also The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the
Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 12 (2006) (statement of Karen J. Mathis, President, ABA), available at http://www.
abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060912testimony-mathis-acpriv.pdf.
108. Marcia Coyle, The "McNulty Memo": Real Change, or Retreat?, 29 NAT'L L.J. 16,
Dec. 15, 2006, at 25.
109. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49 (2006) (statement of
Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP), available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/attyclient/060912testimony-hrgsjud.pdf (noting that regardless of the legal
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By utilizing corporate counsel and pressuring corporations under
the guise of "cooperation," government agencies are capable of
achieving what they could not otherwise achieve by conducting the
interviews themselves-coerce a waiver of an individual's Fifth
Amendment rights.11 ° The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that self-incriminating statements made under threat of
termination by a state actor are coerced and, therefore, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.111 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that a state cannot terminate an employee for exercising his or her
Fifth Amendment rights. For example, in Uniform Sanitation Men
Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of New York, l"' the Su-
preme Court considered whether fifteen employees of the Depart-
ment of Sanitation of New York City were wrongly dismissed from
employment in violation of their constitutional rights when they
refused to waive their Fifth Amendment guarantees.1 1 3 These spe-
cific employees had been questioned during the course of an inves-
tigation as to whether sanitation employees were failing to charge
fees for the use of certain city facilities or keeping fees for them-
selves.' 14 The employees were told that if they refused to testify
based on self-incrimination grounds, their employment and eligibil-
ity for any other employment with the city would terminate.1 15 The
employees refused to testify and were subsequently dismissed from
employment.' 16 The Supreme Court held that the state could not
terminate employees if the plain impact of the proceedings against
the employees was to "present them with a choice between surren-
soundness of such practices, there is a need to re-think the Thompson Memo's dictates as a
policy matter).
110. T.H. Waters III, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of a
"Costly" Right to Silence for Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REv. Li-
1IG. 603, 604-06 (2006).
111. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that statements made
by police officers under threat of termination were obtained in violation of the Constitu-
tion and could not be used in subsequent criminal prosecution at state court).
112. 392 U.S. 290 (1968).
113. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation of New York, 392 U.S.
280, 281-83 (1968). Out of fifteen individuals, twelve refused to testify and were dismissed
because of their refusal. Id. at 282. The other three individuals were brought in front of a
grand jury and asked to sign waivers of immunity and were dismissed after they refused.
Id. at 282-83.
114. Id. at 281.
115. Id. at 281-82.
116. Id. at 282-83.
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dering their constitutional rights or their jobs. 11 7 The Supreme
Court has extended its reasoning in a variety of contexts, including
losses of: job, state contracts, future contracting privileges with the
state, political office, and the right to run for political office in the
future. 1 8 Yet, governmental agencies are able to obtain such waiv-
ers, even if it is indirectly, through the "cooperating" corporation,
which imposes substantial penalties on witnesses who might other-
wise seek to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights.
The constitutionality of both seeking Fifth Amendment waivers
and refusing to advance legal fees under the Thompson Memo was
recently called into question in two opinions issued by Judge Lewis
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York in United States v.
Stein (Stein 1)119 and United States v. Stein (Stein I1).120 The events
in the Stein cases stemmed from an investigation by the IRS into
abusive tax shelters set up by accounting firm KPMG.12 1  In re-
sponse to the investigation, KPMG hired an outside firm to help
117. Uniform Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284-85. Had the state demanded that peti-
tioners answer "questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance
of their official duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring relin-
quishment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so,"
the case may have been decided differently. Id. at 284.
118. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 803-08 (1977) (finding unconstitu-
tional a statute that automatically terminated a politician's status as office holder for five
years if he refused to waive self-incrimination immunity); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
76, 82-83 (1973) (acknowledging the unconstitutionality of a statute that disqualified the
contractor from existing and future public contracts if the contractor did not waive his
immunity when testifying to the state about his contract); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 276-79 (1968) (discussing a city charter provision discharging a police officer for not
waiving his immunity from prosecution); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of
Sanitation of New York, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968) (determining that a city charter which
forced city employees to choose between giving up their jobs or their constitutional rights
denied the discharged employees "the benefit of the Constitution"); Garrity v. State of
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967) (explaining that testimony from a police officer
forced to testify under threat of removal may not be used against such officer); cf. Minne-
sota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434, 440 (1984) (discussing the threat of revocation of proba-
tion for not answering, although ultimately finding the disclosures were not compelled
because the witness was not "required ... to choose between making incriminating state-
ments and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent" ). See generally United
States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 657-58 (3rd Cir. 1991) (summarizing previous cases which
"held that the government may not impose a penalty on a person for asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege").
119. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
120. 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
121. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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develop a cooperative strategy with the government. 122 As part of
this strategy, KPMG decided to "clean house," essentially termi-
nating high-level employees who later became the subject of a
criminal investigation along with other retained KPMG
employees.
123
In the first of the two opinions, issued on June 26, 2006, the court
found that prosecutors exerted pressure upon KPMG by imple-
menting policies under the Thompson Memo. 124 This pressure
caused KPMG to deny advancement of legal fees to employees
under criminal investigation-legal fees which KPMG normally
paid for its employees.125 The court held that the prosecutors' ac-
tions infringed on the employees' Fifth Amendment right to due
process as well as their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 126 The
court continued to question the Thompson Memo's constitutional-
ity one month later with regard to KPMG's threat to terminate
certain employees who refused to talk to prosecutors. 127 In Stein
II, the court held that where prosecutors pressured KPMG to
threaten termination of employees who did not make statements to
prosecutors, such statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 128
Quoting the United States Supreme Court's decision, Garrity v.
New Jersey,129 the court stated, "[i]t no longer may be doubted that
economic coercion to secure a waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination, where it is attributable to the government, violates
the Fifth Amendment if the pressure is sufficient 'to deprive[ ] [the
accused] of his "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to an-
swer."' - 130 The court concluded that such statements should there-
fore be suppressed.13 '
122. Id. at 339.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 336, 338.
125. Id. at 336, 347.
126. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y 2006).
127. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
128. Id. at 334-35, 337.
129. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
130. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quot-
ing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967)).
131. Id. at 338. The court concluded:
In this case, the pressure that was exerted on the Moving Defendants was a product
of intentional government action. The government brandished a big stick-it
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The Stein rulings have important potential impacts on the "depu-
tized" counsel. An attorney may arguably be in violation of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct when questioning an em-
ployee who has been pressured by such tactics into talking or who
has been denied legal fees. Model Rule 4.4 states: "In representing
a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial pur-
pose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person.'1 32 This provision has been held to prohibit conduct
that violates the rights of third persons, such as surreptitiously tap-
ing or recording conversations with witnesses in violation of wire-
tapping laws.133 Under the Stein reasoning, "deputized" counsel
may violate an employee's constitutional rights by interviewing
him or her in certain circumstances. If an employee consents to the
interview and waives Fifth Amendment protections only out of a
fear of termination, it could be argued that the attorney is using
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the employee's consti-
tutional rights. A similar argument could be made with regard to
the deprivation of advancing attorneys' fees. These concerns are
heightened in situations where it is in the corporation's best inter-
est to find a scapegoat, thus making the relationship with the em-
ployee adversarial.
C. Heightened Brady Concerns
Another consideration for corporate counsel is what responsibil-
ity, if any, does "deputized" counsel have to reveal exculpatory
materials to employees who are later indicted. To illustrate, con-
sider the following hypothetical. Imagine attorney J. Doe inter-
threatened to indict KPMG. And it held out a very large carrot. It offered KPMG the
hope of avoiding the fate of Arthur Andersen if KPMG could deliver to the USAO
employees who would talk, notwithstanding their constitutional right to remain silent,
and strip those employees of economic means of defending themselves. In two in-
stances, that pressure resulted in statements that otherwise would not have been
made. ... The coerced statements and their fruits must be suppressed.
Id. at 337-38.
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4.4 (2006) (emphasis added).
133. Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 577, 579 (2005)
(discussing the potential problems lawyers face when they secretly record conversations);
see also ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422, at 1201:106
(2001) (outlining the rules and conduct lawyers must follow when electronically recording
conversations).
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views employee A. During the course of the interview, it becomes
apparent to Doe that employee A may have been involved in an
accounting fraud scheme. Two days later, however, Doe interviews
employee B and during the course of the interview, B reveals infor-
mation that exculpates A or mitigates A's role in the fraud. One
year later, Doe discovers that A is under indictment for accounting
fraud, a charge that in light of the evidence revealed to Doe by
employee B, should probably not be brought against A. Does Doe
have any obligation to reveal the exculpatory evidence to em-
ployee A?
If Doe were an actual prosecutor, the answer would likely be
"yes." As a matter of law, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires prosecutors to disclose evidence upon request to
the defense that could assist the defendant.134 This rule, commonly
referred to as the Brady Rule, has been summarized as follows: "a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to disclosure of excul-
patory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. ' 135 The
Brady Rule expands to include evidence that would be useful to
impeach a prosecution witness, 136 and even extends to evidence
that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecu-
tor, thus placing a burden on the prosecution to learn of any
favorable evidence known to others acting on behalf of the govern-
ment. 137 Therefore, turning back to our hypothetical, a prosecutor
would have a duty under Brady to disclose the exculpatory evi-
dence learned from employee B.
Beyond the legal duty to disclose, a prosecutor would also have
an ethical duty to disclose. Under Model Rule 3.8(d), a prosecutor
in a criminal case is required to:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or informa-
tion known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
134. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression of
favorable evidence from the accused is a due process violation).
135. Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1213 (2000) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995)).
136. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining that impeach-
ment evidence is within the scope of the Brady Rule); see also Lisa M. Kurcias, Note,
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1214
(2000) (explaining Bagley).
137. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (explaining that a "prosecutor has a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police").
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accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing,
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 3 8
The Canons of Professional Ethics provide that a prosecutor
"should make timely disclosure to the defense of available evi-
dence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
139
The justification of these rules is based on the premise that a prose-
cutor's primary duty "'is not to convict, but to see that justice is
done.'"140 These disclosure obligations are also based on the fact
that prosecutors have a police force that investigates their cases
and gathers evidence for them which could lead to a "great ineq-
uity between the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial."14'
Turning again to our hypothetical, it would appear that a prosecu-
tor would be required to disclose the information learned from em-
ployee B.
But while the duty of a prosecutor is defined in both case law
and the Model Rules, no such guidance exists for an attorney con-
ducting an investigation essentially for the government. The rules
generally acknowledge a lawyer's role as "a representative of cli-
ents, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having spe-
cial responsibility for the quality of justice."' 42 As an officer of the
legal system who has a special responsibility for the quality of jus-
tice, it would seem that the "deputized" counsel should, at the very
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006). The ethical obligations are
generally broader than the Brady Rule in that they require disclosure of all evidence, not
just that which is material, but narrower in that they do not extend to impeachment evi-
dence or impose a duty upon prosecutors to discover evidence in the hands of its agents.
Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1205, 1216 (2000). The United States Attorney's Manual further recognizes that
exculpatory evidence should be disclosed to the grand jury before seeking an indictment
against a person. U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11.233 (2006).
139. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-13 (1980). The Model Code was
replaced by Model Rules in 1983. Robert W. Meserve, Chairperson's Introduction to
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 2 (2001).
140. Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1212 (2000) (quoting CANONS OF PROF'L ETHics Canon 5
(1908)).
141. Id. at 1209 (citing Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 54-55, 59 (1991)).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2006).
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least, have a duty to try and inform the prosecution of such evi-
dence. But if the prosecutor does not make the evidence available
to the defense, does the "deputized" counsel have any obligation to
actually reveal the information to the defense?
As with so many situations already discussed, the Model Rules
do not provide clear guidance, perhaps because the "deputized"
role was never envisioned. While an argument could certainly be
made that disclosure of some sort is required,143 what if such disclo-
sure is counter to the interests of the corporate client? For in-
stance, a limited number of jurisdictions allow disclosure of
privileged materials to the government without waiving the privi-
lege to third parties. 144 The "deputized" counsel's corporate client
may not wish the exculpatory material to be made public for fear
of negative publicity or third-party civil suits. In such a situation,
the "deputized" counsel may feel a tension between zealously rep-
resenting his client and allowing an innocent employee to stand
trial. Without further guidance, the deputized counsel will likely
143. Model Rule 3.3(a), dealing with the candor and respect lawyers must show to-
wards a tribunal, could arguably apply:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client,
or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.
MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006). The major obstacle to this argument is
that Rule 3.3 is couched in terms of applying to a lawyer before the tribunal. See id. R. 3.3
cmt. 1 (stating, "[t]his Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in
the proceedings of a tribunal"). Thus, if corporate counsel is not representing a party
before the tribunal, no obligation under Model Rule 3.3 would appear to apply.
144. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(adopting "limited" or "selective" waiver of attorney-client privilege in a case where dis-
closure was made to a government agency pursuant to an internal investigation); see also
Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 734 (2006) (noting the various
jurisdictions adopting selective waiver). See generally Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investiga-
tions, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at
All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155 (2006) (discussing the relative merits of selective waiver).
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feel obligated to remain silent, a result that does not further the
"quality of justice" or the reputation of the profession in general.
V. CONCLUSION
The Thompson Memo has brought dramatic changes to the way
corporations approach internal investigations-changes which will
not likely be reversed by the McNulty Memo. Where waiving the
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity was once a
true choice, today many corporations feel compelled to waive such
protections to avoid indictment. The result of this "culture of
waiver" has been the "deputation" of corporate counsel. But this
"deputation" has created a class of attorneys that fall between the
ethical rules of a private attorney, representing a client, and an at-
torney, such as a prosecutor, who represents the public's interests.
The result is that "deputized" counsel may face ethical issues much
larger than they even realize, ranging from heightened warning re-
quirements, to the possibility that the interviews themselves are vi-
olating the legal rights of the employees being interviewed. While
no clear guidance is readily available, such "deputized" attorneys
should make themselves aware of such issues in an effort to act
ethically until the Model Rules are amended, or the Thompson
Memo policies are altered or retracted, thus alleviating the many
tensions that currently exist for the "deputized" counsel.
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